June 2, 2025
New Straits Times

Phar Kim Beng, Kuala Lumpur

The anxieties of the Indo-Pacific came into full view at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles demanded an explanation from China for what he called an “extraordinary military build-up”.

Later, Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. branded China’s conduct in the South China Sea as “absolutely irresponsible and reckless”.

The message they convey is deeply interconnected: the Indo-Pacific is on edge. Two key United States allies — one a resident power, the other a proximate neighbour to China — are openly expressing their strategic alarm.

Australia’s concerns are rooted in the opaque and accelerated nature of China’s military modernisation.

From aircraft carriers and hypersonic missiles to deepening cyber and space capabilities, China is not merely modernising — it is transforming the strategic equation of the Indo-Pacific.

For Canberra, this raises fundamental questions: What are China’s intentions? What security guarantees can regional states rely on when the regional balance of power is tilting so rapidly?

As a staunch member of the Aukus partnership and a longtime US ally, Australia is not unfamiliar with military alliances. Yet, it seeks more than just deterrence. It wants reassurance, especially from Beijing that strategic competition will not descend into confrontation.

In this sense, Marles’ remarks are not hawkish, but rather reflective of a nation navigating uncertainty. And it is precisely this uncertainty that Asean, through the Asean Regional Forum and Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), must address.

For the Philippines, the danger is not speculative. It is already confronting Chinese maritime coercion in the South China Sea.

From water cannon attacks near Second Thomas Shoal to sonar interference in its exclusive economic zone, the Philippines is on the front line of China’s maritime assertiveness.

Teodoro’s choice of words — “irresponsible” and “reckless” — is not mere diplomatic posturing. It reflects the lived reality of a Southeast Asian state struggling to assert its sovereignty amid an asymmetrical power contest.

That said, Philippines and China must redouble efforts to co-exist: otherwise, Manila risks being sucked into the vortex of US politics, rendering the Philippines all but a surrogate of the US.

The risk of escalation is real. Any miscalculation in these contested waters could quickly drag in external powers, especially with the US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty now more operational than symbolic.

A localised maritime incident could rapidly spiral into a wider regional conflict.

Both Canberra’s demand for clarity and Manila’s call for accountability point to a shared regional need: a trusted, neutral forum to manage tensions, build confidence and enforce norms.

That forum is Asean. And it must act before others do. The Asean Regional Forum, long criticised for being a talk shop, must now institutionalise mechanisms that promote transparency in military modernisation.

Asean can propose a Regional Military Transparency Registry, encouraging major players, including China, to voluntarily disclose exercises, deployments and strategic doctrines.

This will not eliminate mistrust, but it can begin to manage it.

The ADMM-Plus, which includes China, Australia, the US and all major Indo-Pacific actors, offers a more defence-oriented platform.

Here, Asean should advocate for the establishment of an Incidents-at-Sea Protocol, modelled on Cold War-era US-Soviet agreements.

Such a mechanism would allow real-time communication between naval forces during close encounters, thereby reducing the risk of unintended conflict.

Additionally, Asean must press for the long-delayed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to become legally binding. It is no longer enough to merely discuss principles. Enforcement mechanisms must follow.

The Philippines’ repeated confrontations with China show that vague promises are insufficient.

Asean must also creatively utilise its middle powers — Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam — to initiate back-channel diplomacy to build trust among conflicting parties without the constraints of formal negotiation.

In this context, Malaysia’s current role as Asean chair and its tradition of non-alignment make it particularly suited to initiate such Track 2 dialogues.

Australia’s quest for strategic reassurance and the Philippines’ demand for accountability reflect a larger regional cry for order, predictability and norms.

Asean, by virtue of its geography and centrality in regional architecture, remains the best-positioned body to take up this task.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.