May 1, 2025
Malay Mail

Phar Kim Beng, Kuala Lumpur

The elections in Singapore and Australia tomorrow offer a window into the broader disquiet that besets international relations.

These polls provide Asean with critical clues about how member states and their partners perceive the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States, the unpredictability of the European Union’s response to the war in Ukraine, and the enduring ambition of Russia to reclaim lost influence.

The outcomes of these elections do not merely reflect national discontent or endorsement; they expose deep anxieties about a world increasingly dominated by the ruthless pursuit of gaining an advantage over rivals (relative gains).

As open, trade-dependent democracies, both countries are finely attuned to the ebb and flow of geopolitical rivalries.

Their political choices tomorrow will reveal how far these global tensions have trickled down into public consciousness.

For Asean, the implications are profound.

In Singapore, the election will be a litmus test of the People’s Action Party’s ability to reassure citizens amid economic volatility and strategic uncertainty.

The island republic has long walked a tightrope between China and the US, benefiting from both American security guarantees and Chinese investments and trade.

This balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult.

The rise of digital nationalism, tensions over semiconductor supply chains, and ideological contestation between liberal and authoritarian governance models are polarising the region.

Singapore’s voters, while focused on cost of living and housing, are increasingly aware that their leaders must navigate an environment where choosing sides could come at great economic and political costs.

Australia, on the other hand, continues to wrestle with strategic identity.

Oscillating between its Anglo-American heritage and its Asian geography, Canberra has at times adopted a schizophrenic foreign policy posture — staunchly pro-American in defence, yet heavily dependent on Chinese markets for its exports.

The government of Anthony Albanese, while outwardly cooperative with Washington and Beijing, has been cautious not to alienate either.

However, anxieties surrounding Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure investments, cybersecurity threats and controversial political donations have fuelled public scepticism.

If opposition parties like the Liberal-National Coalition perform well or even regain ground, it would signal growing discomfort with the government’s hedging strategy.

This, too, would serve as a data point for Asean to assess how viable multi-alignment strategies really are in an era of intensifying great power rivalries.

What unites both electoral environments is a growing fatigue with transactional global politics. Neither Singapore nor Australia is blind to the fact that major powers — from the US to China, from the EU to Russia — are increasingly operating based on finite competitive logics.

The EU, while championing human rights and multilateralism, has paradoxically imposed carbon tariffs that disproportionately hurt Asean’s export economies.

Russia’s war on Ukraine, meanwhile, has revived fears of energy weaponisation and great power revisionism.

These global developments feed into domestic debates, influencing how electorates view foreign policy, economic security and national sovereignty.

For Asean, the lesson is unmistakable: the age of absolute gains is receding.

The vision of a world where interdependence breeds peace and prosperity is being undermined by a geopolitical order dominated by suspicion, coercion and the pursuit of dominance.

Asean’s credibility as a rules-based, non-aligned bloc will increasingly depend on its ability to read these electoral signals accurately and recalibrate its collective posture.

Rather than waiting for the dust to settle from global contests, Asean must act proactively.

This includes deepening regional economic integration, strengthening the Asean Digital Economy Framework Agreement and enhancing political coordination in track one and track two diplomacy.

If Singapore and Australia — both seen as bellwethers of the Indo-Pacific — are feeling the pressures of competing imperialism, then Asean must brace itself for even sharper dilemmas.

But within those dilemmas lie an opportunity to champion multilateralism not as a relic of the post-Cold War order, but as a framework to resist the tyranny of relative gains.

The writer is a professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and a visiting faculty member at the University of Malaya.